

Online Appendix for: Bunker, K., & Negretto, G. “The Party System Effects of Unstable Electoral Rules in Latin America” [*Party Politics*].¹

**Table A1
Explaining ENPv in Latin America by Electoral Experience
Institutional Models**

	Electoral Institutions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Regressor	All Elections	Early Elections	Late Elections
ln(MS)	0.929 (0.643)	0.440 (0.546)	1.808** (0.766)
Upper tier	4.860 (2.901)	2.813 (2.869)	8.463** (3.773)
Presidential formula	0.792 (0.918)	1.559 (1.143)	0.290 (0.585)
Proximity	0.169 (1.578)	1.000 (1.507)	-0.720 (1.405)
Presidential formula*proximity	0.313 (0.809)	-0.728 (0.953)	1.041* (0.572)
Time	0.0180 (0.015)	0.006 (0.024)	0.028 (0.030)
Constant	-4.520 (5.354)	-1.680 (4.570)	-10.163 (6.108)
Obs.	198	90	108
R2	0.274	0.246	0.383
R2 (adj.)	0.252	0.191	0.346

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by country. ***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1.

¹ Code and Data available at: Bunker, Kenneth; Negretto, Gabriel, 2023, "Replication Data for: The Party System Effects of Unstable Electoral Rules in Latin America", <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QPA1T3>, Harvard Dataverse.

Table A2
Predicted ENPv in Latin America by Electoral Experience

	Simple Electoral Systems (1)			Complex Electoral Systems (2)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Regressor	All Elections	Early Elections	Late Elections	All Elections	Early Elections	Late Elections
Predicted ENPv simple (3)	2.491** (1.115)	1.611* (0.890)	3.781** (1.564)			
Predicted ENPv complex(4)				1.963* (1.197)	0.970 (1.077)	3.244** (1.517)
Constant	-4.382 (3.750)	-1.879 (3.089)	-8.382 (5.199)	-2.182 (4.015)	0.699 (3.730)	-6.114 (4.934)
Obs.	147	69	78	198	90	108
R2	0.236	0.237	0.303	0.124	0.055	0.221
R2 (adj.)	0.231	0.226	0.294	0.119	0.045	0.214

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by country. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.

(1) Single-tier electoral systems.

(2) Single and two-tier electoral systems.

(3) $Nv = [(MS)^{1/4} + 1]^{2/3}$ (Shugart and Taagepera 2017: 125-138).

(4) $Nv = [J^i(MS_B)^{1/4} + 1]^{2/3}$ (Shugart and Taagepera 2017: 263). We derive the term J empirically from our dataset.

Table A3
Explaining ENPv in Latin America by Electoral Experience and Electoral Regime Stability
Institutional Models

	Electoral Institutions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Regressor	All Elections	Early Elections	Late Elections
ln(MS)	1.229* (0.692)	0.510 (0.604)	1.924** (0.746)
Upper tier	5.024 (3.621)	2.464 (4.065)	7.394* (3.914)
Presidential formula	1.583 (1.408)	2.081* (1.182)	0.726 (1.315)
Proximity	0.955 (2.343)	2.744 (1.785)	-0.745 (2.429)
Presidential formula*proximity	-0.363 (1.346)	-1.389 (1.025)	0.766 (1.270)
Time	0.0170 (0.0209)	-0.088* (0.046)	0.035 (0.025)
Constant	-7.510 (5.926)	-2.012 (4.697)	-11.570* (6.274)
Obs.	123	37	86
R2	0.324	0.344	0.438
R2 (adj.)	0.289	0.213	0.395

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by country. ***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1.

Table A4
Predicted ENPv in Latin America by Electoral Experience and Electoral Regime Stability

	Simple Electoral Systems (1)			Complex Electoral Systems (2)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Regressor	All Elections	Early Elections	Late Elections	All Elections	Early Elections	Late Elections
Predicted ENPv_simple (3)	3.027** (1.229)	1.893* (1.016)	3.975** (1.486)			
Predicted ENPv_complex(4)				2.580* (1.299)	1.057 (1.357)	3.727** (1.385)
Constant	-6.064 (4.138)	-2.661 (3.526)	-9.104* (4.938)	-4.146 (4.363)	0.704 (4.759)	-7.896* (4.495)
Obs.	95	29	66	123	37	86
R2	0.315	0.392	0.356	0.195	0.072	0.293
R2 (adj.)	0.307	0.369	0.346	0.189	0.045	0.284

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by country. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.


(1) Single-tier electoral systems.

(2) Single and two-tier electoral systems.

(3) $Nv = [(MS)^{1/4} + 1]^{2/3}$ (Shugart and Taagepera 2017: 125-138).


(4) $Nv = [J'(MS_B)^{1/4} + 1]^{2/3}$ (Shugart and Taagepera 2017: 263). We derive the term J empirically from our dataset.

Figure A1. Marginal Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on ENPv, by Average District Magnitude as Number varies between one (1) and twelve (12)



Note. Red dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals.

Figure A2. Marginal Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on ENPv, by Average District Magnitude as Stability varies between one (1) and twelve (12)



Note. Red dotted lines represent 90% confidence interval.